

a preliminary
staff report

SELECTED ASPECTS OF
URBAN RENEWAL
AND
THE NEGRO IN CHICAGO

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"Urban renewal is a highly commendable, necessary and desirable means to the physical and social rebuilding of our city -- but it must always be viewed in terms of its effects on the citizens of all sections of the city -- including those who wear the badge of color."

Dr. N. O. Calloway, President
Chicago Urban League

"...What we are seeking, I think, is a bonafide and practical expression of the community's own projected program to deal with its own problems, presented in good faith and with the firm resolve to carry that program through to accomplishment. The workable program requirement would be meaningless on any other basis, and any community that defaults on its own program through laxity or indifference should forfeit its right to continued Federal assistance."

Albert M. Cole
Housing and Home Finance Agency
Testimony before the
Senate Committee on Banking &
Currency
March 12, 1954

"...Urban redevelopment (in Chicago)...is acting to reduce Negro living space, deny areas to Negroes, and institutionalize and extend the ghetto. The programs of the official and quasi-official agencies of the body politic have been and are being subverted and channeled into the framework of the process of segregation."

Abstract of a dissertation
fulfilling requirements for
Ph. D. in Regional Planning,
Harvard University, by
David A. Wallace, 1953.

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Chicago Urban League Staff Report on Urban Renewal

INTRODUCTION

It is the policy and program of the Chicago Urban League to strengthen the democratic way of life through the improvement of race relations and to establish, as a living reality, the concept of equal opportunity for all Americans. An integral part of this policy and program is the recognition of two things, (1) the right to a "decent home in a good neighborhood" for all -- Negro and white alike; and (2) that a successful housing program for Chicago becomes possible only to the extent that its housing programs provide an improvement in housing and other amenities of living and equal access to the housing market: for all the citizenry, regardless of their accident of birth or economic lot.

Any examination of the housing picture in Chicago is a many-faceted and complex one. Chicago has been groping for new methods and solutions to its housing crisis since the end of World War II. These attempts have resulted in the creation of some new housing, both public and private, and some new industrial developments in the central city.

Put together these attempts have become known as "urban renewal", which has been heralded as a means to save our cities from the decay, deterioration and potential death caused by blight, choking transportation systems and lower tax revenues, and to rebuild better cities for the people who live and work in them.

Important to the Chicago Urban League is a consideration of whether or not the development of these new areas of glass, steel and brick through urban renewal has been at the expense of certain human values. Specifically, the Chicago Urban League is concerned with the far-reaching effects on the lives of the many families influenced by this change -- especially Negroes.

The Urban League proposes in this report to analyze some of the objectives of urban renewal, together with the agencies and laws responsible for the creation and execution of urban renewal policy. This analysis is conducted against a background study of the nature and extent of housing segregation in Chicago.

This report is the first in a series of housing studies to be developed by the Chicago Urban League. Subsequent reports will discuss public housing, private housing (Chicago and suburban) and open occupancy. Out of them the Chicago Urban League hopes to develop a housing program and policy which will be addressed, in a creative and positive way, to the housing needs and problems of the total Chicago community.

In this report we will review some of the characteristics of Negro residential segregation and population and urban renewal. Specific emphasis will be placed upon "the workable program", code enforcement, housing for displaced families and the need for a comprehensive master plan for Chicago.

SUMMARY

The Chicago urban renewal program is designed to replace existing land uses which no longer conform to needs or standards, with planned rebuilding of these areas.

In order to accomplish these goals vast sums of public and private funds are being expended to acquire land, relocate families, demolish structures, provide new public facilities and build new housing and institutions.

This has, and will continue to have a profound impact on the life of the city -- especially in the neighborhoods affected by the various programs.

In seeking to study this impact we have examined relocation, code enforcement, planning and housing for displaced persons. In so doing we have arrived at the point of view that where these programs impinge upon the lives of minority people there is an indication of a great lack of consistent, forthright and honest planning and execution of effective policy.

Supporting such a view are these conclusions:

1. Chicago has become the most segregated major city (over 500,000 population) in the United States.

2. Negroes in Chicago live in much less satisfactory housing than whites and this condition has become worse in the years since 1950. Moreover, Negroes pay more than whites for equivalent kinds of housing.
3. There is a distinct geographic coincidence between Chicago's urban renewal programs and areas of Negro residential concentration (see accompanying map).
4. An important element of the workable program is that its activity be part of an officially stated comprehensive plan for the development of the city. Such a plan does not now exist.
5. In the period from 1948-56, approximately 86,000 persons were displaced by various urban renewal projects. This is equivalent to the 1950 population of Springfield, Illinois. It is estimated that 67 per cent of these relocatees were Negro. This means that over 11 per cent of the Chicago Negro population of 1950 was forced to relocate in an eight year period.
6. Chicago's approved and planned (1958-59) urban renewal program envisions the future additional displacement of 131,000 persons -- equal to the 1950 population of Gary, Indiana. Negroes will comprise approximately 86,000 persons of this staggering total.
7. Program projections of relocation prospects have been based on a vacancy rate for the entire city. To Negroes this is tragic hypocrisy. Not being free to take advantage of the total available vacancies they double-up in areas of transition, thereby facilitating the slum cycle through more extensive use.
8. There is no substantial program, even in the formative stage, to provide the necessary homes available to Negroes, either by private enterprise or public action.
9. Negroes in Chicago who are able to buy or build homes are largely cut off from normal selection and normal financing.

10. Chicago Negroes who seek to rent are limited to a restricted area, and within this ghetto must compete with each other for the artificially restricted supply, thus compounding the existence of over-crowding.
11. Urban renewal, in all its forms, is a desirable and effective tool, but it can only be truly effective and meaningful when Negroes and other minorities have equal accessibility to the market.
12. The emphasis which urban renewal has placed upon "slum clearance" has resulted in no new housing construction on predominately vacant land, except for some public housing units. This has helped to create the over-crowding and conditions of blight in areas adjoining clearance areas. Moreover, no net gain in available housing units has resulted from this emphasis on clearance, rather than vacant land construction.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the Mayor appoint a "blue ribbon" citizens committee to closely examine the nature, policy and operation of Chicago's urban renewal program, with particular regard to its impact upon minority groups. We urge such a committee to consider the following recommendations.
2. Urban renewal activity begin to address itself, in more concrete terms, to the development of housing in vacant land areas of the city. The Land Clearance Commission is empowered, under the Blighted Areas and Redevelopment Act of 1947, to assemble "tax delinquent" and other vacant land for redevelopment purposes.
3. That all public agencies engaged in the relocation process seek housing for relocation families in the total Chicago housing market, - not solely in areas of Negro concentration.

4. Public housing site selection and development should be designed to minimize concentration of Negroes and to maximize their distribution in standard neighborhoods consistent with the other objectives of sound planning.
5. Comprehensive planning, which in its implementation inevitably involves population redistribution, should insure, through density and housing type recommendations, a reduction in concentration by income and racial groups consistent with other objectives of sound planning.
6. A joint city-state program in cooperation with private builders should be initiated to construct demonstration, private housing developments with open occupancy. The city should establish a revolving fund for loans at a low interest rate to builders to be used as working capital for such demonstration projects.
7. That relocation activities of the now several public agencies be centralized into one relocation authority, either by ordinance or agreement; and that there be established a priority system based on need and expected dates of demolition. In conjunction with the above, a citizens advisory committee on relocation be appointed by the Mayor to watch-dog the operations of this central relocation authority.
8. The actions of governments should be toward the ending of discrimination and the promotion of a free market in housing in the city and the metropolitan area, and not in reinforcing residential segregation.
9. That there be developed a comprehensive plan for the city and the metropolitan area, with provision for periodic revision. This task should be the first priority of the City Planning Department. An interim generalized plan should be produced within one year and a more specific plan within three years. All the standards and preliminary determinations (including basic assumptions) involved in the comprehensive plan should be published and discussed with interested citizen's groups. The comprehensive plan should be brought up to date and revisions published at intervals not exceeding five years.

10. While it appears local agencies engaged in the relocation process have taken corrective action relative to code enforcement when relocatees were housed in substandard housing, we are nevertheless constrained to urge the Comptroller General's office to again review the practices of the responsible agencies to determine if this is being carried out and to further ascertain if all urban renewal programs, involving federal appropriations are complying with the legislative intent of Congress. This should be accomplished in order to determine that areas of racial transition are protected from overcrowding and that further overcrowding of areas adjacent to slum clearance areas is prevented.
11. That the Chicago Urban League adopt an action program designed to implement the foregoing recommendations. This program should involve activity both on the level of community participation and with official agencies in the urban renewal structure.

POPULATION AND NEGRO RESIDENTIAL CONCENTRATION

The significance of population characteristics in discussing housing is a vital one. The pressure created by increasing population movements in and around the city demand an understanding of these characteristics. Moreover, the picture for nonwhites, who constitute the overwhelming majority of this increase, exacerbates the problem.

Housing will become an increasingly vital issue in the years to come. A glance at the expanding population which must be sheltered demonstrates this. (See population table in appendix)

The total population of Chicago was estimated to be 3,789,000 in 1955.^{1/} The nonwhite population of the city approaches the one million mark. By 1965 it is estimated that the city will contain 929,000 and the entire metropolitan area 1,119,000 nonwhites. This will be out of a total estimated 1965 population of nearly four million in the city and seven million in the Chicago metropolitan area.

Nonwhites as a proportion of the city's total population has increased greatly. In 1900 nonwhites were 1.8% of the total city population; in 1950 they were 14.1% of the total; in 1956 they were 19%; and by 1965 it is estimated that they will be 23% -- almost one-fourth.

In the suburban area the proportional picture has been more static than in the city. In 1900 nonwhites were 1.3% of the total population; in 1950 they were 5.1% of this total; in 1956, 5.7%; and by 1965 it is estimated that they will be 6.4% of the total population.

^{1/} These are high projections of population done by the Chicago Community Inventory and the Scripps Foundation. The 1955 and 1965 projections are based on Donald J. Bogue's, An Estimate of Metropolitan Chicago's Future Population: 1955 to 1965, University of Chicago and Miami University, 1955.

NEGRO RESIDENTIAL CONCENTRATION IN CHICAGO^{2/}

Between 1898 and 1950 there was a steady rise in Negro residential concentration, which leveled off between 1940 and 1950, because of a rapid transition of neighborhoods from white to Negro occupancy.

During the 1940 to 1950 decade the total population increased 6.6% and the number of dwelling units 14.5%. However, while the white population actually decreased 0.1%, whites occupied MORE dwellings in 1950 than they did in 1940. The nonwhite population increased 80.5% while there was an increase of only 72.3% in the dwellings that were Negro occupied.

While the nonwhite population increased, the dwelling units occupied by them failed to increase at the same rate.^{3/} Whites, on the contrary, decreased in population but increased their number of occupied units. Stated statistically, whites occupied 419.7 dwellings per 1000 adult population in 1950, an increase of 32.5 dwellings from the previous decade. Negroes, on the other hand, occupied 372 units per 1000 adult population in 1950, which was a decrease of 11.1 units from 1940. Thus, what was unequal in 1940 was increasingly unequal in 1950.

CHICAGO'S CONCENTRATION RELATIVE TO OTHER CITIES^{4/}

In an index of segregation, conducted by Willis and Bell, which examined Negro residential segregation in a metropolitan areas, Chicago rated highest in cities over 500,000 population.

^{2/} David A. Wallace, Unpublished thesis, Residential Concentration of Negroes in Chicago, Harvard University, 1953. (On microfilm at University of Chicago Library)

^{3/} Otis Dudley Duncan and Beverly Duncan, The Negro Population of Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1957, p. 77.

^{4/} Wendell Bell and Ernest M. Willis, The Segregation of Negroes in American Cities: A Comparative Analysis, in Social and Economic Studies. Institute of Social and Economic Research, University College of the West Indies, Jamaica, B. W. I., March 1957. Based on studies conducted at Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois.

This trend (unless reversed) toward increased metropolitan concentration indicates that 4/5 of the Negro population will be concentrated in the city by 1965, while only one half the white population will be left in the city, the remainder having been diffused to the suburbs.

REASONS FOR INCREASED CONCENTRATION OF NEGROES^{5/}

While poverty and self-segregation have some effect on the increased concentration of Negroes, restrictive action, or manipulation, is the key factor involved, according to Wallace.

Although the income structure of the Negro population is less than one half that of the white, there are still a significant number of Negroes who are economically capable of moving out of the concentration.

Some suggest that the desire to "be with their own kind" applies to Negro segregation patterns as well as to European groups. However, after the initial entry of Italian and Polish born into Chicago, they had a tendency to diffuse. Negroes experienced an opposite trend. Self-segregation, where it exists, is the result of restrictive action.

OVERCROWDING WITHIN DWELLING UNITS^{6/}

Between 1940 and 1950 overcrowding and rent rates increased considerably faster for non-whites than for whites, and non-whites got less desirable housing than whites. This did not seem to be entirely a function of income, since non-whites apparently can pay a rent nearly equal to whites for this inferior housing, in spite of the fact that it takes a disproportionate share of the Negro's income.

Fifty three per cent of Negro housing was sub-standard or dilapidated, while 15% of white housing was of this nature.

^{5/} Wallace, op. cit.

^{6/} Otis Dudley Duncan and Beverly Duncan, op. cit., p. 79.

RESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION BY RACE RELATED TO CHANGES IN
HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS 1940 - 1950

Residential succession of race takes place when one racial category of the population replaces another as residents of an area. The concern here is, of course, with Negro-white relationships.

The expansion of the Negro residential concentration never quite kept pace with the population growth. Once a small area had 10% of its residential occupancy reported as non-white, it tended to increase this proportion at various rates of increase from a low to a high. When a small area reached between 25% and 75% Negro occupancy it rather uniformly experienced a large increase (20% or more) in its proportion of non-white occupancy.

THE MIGRANT^{7/}

Most Negro migrants to the Chicago area enter areas of established Negro residence. The movement of Negroes into formerly all white areas is led by those who have lived some time in the city.

Studies indicate that as Negroes enter an all white residential area, the residential density increases. However, the increase is slower than in subsequent stages of transition.^{8/} Crowding is most severe in the middle stages, and levels off at the later stage, having reached some sort of saturation point.^{9/} Rent increases are highest in the early stage of transition, and decline in subsequent stages.^{10/} Competition between Negro and white is strongest in the earlier stages.

^{7/} *ibid.*, p. 13.

^{8/} *ibid.*, p. 245.

^{9/} *ibid.*, p. 246.

^{10/} *ibid.*, p. 252.

These studies of the nature and extent of increasing Negro residential segregation suggest an implication relating it to the impact of urban renewal. With Negroes not being able to avail themselves of the normal selective process for housing, and the consequent doubling up, the development of the slum cycle is facilitated. Urban renewal, because of its primary impact as presently implemented in areas of Negro concentration aids in this process.

URBAN RENEWAL
AND
THE WORKABLE PROGRAM

URBAN RENEWAL AND NEGRO RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION

The increase in non-white population in the city and the consequent increase in residential segregation has special meaning and impact on the workings of urban renewal. And since urban renewal has, up to now, had primary impact upon the communities of high Negro density, the Chicago Urban League has a special concern for understanding urban renewal and its implications.

This section of the report will be concerned with probing the workable program and these elements of it:

- Codes and enforcement
- Housing for displaced persons
- A comprehensive physical plan for
the general development of the community

DEFINITION OF RENEWAL

The definition of urban renewal to be used here is roughly the one implied by the map on the next page. The map includes not only projects supported by federal funds, but all major projects falling under this definition:¹

"...the revision or replacement of an existing land use and population distribution pattern through the acquisition of a predominately built up area, and the clearance and rebuilding of this area..."

We accept the above definition of urban renewal tentatively in order to establish an operational basis for analysis of urban renewal. The Metropolitan Planning and Housing Council of Chicago is the source for urban renewal project information on the map.

In summary, the map indicates the location of such items as expressways, major developments, slum clearance areas, public housing and publicly-assisted middle-income housing as being urban renewal. Conservation areas were separated out as projects

¹ F. Stuart Chapin, Jr., URBAN LAND USE AND PLANNING, Harper and Brothers, Publishers, New York, 1957, p. 231

KEY

Urban Renewal
Projects


Conservation
Areas

Negro Resi-
dential Areas

A. EXPRESSWAYS

1. North Route
2. Lake Shore Drive
3. Erie Street Branch
4. Wacker Drive
5. Northwest Route
6. Edens

Chicago's NEGRO RESIDENTIAL AREAS as related to URBAN RENEWAL



to stem the growth of blight and are not necessarily total renewal under our definition. However, they are presented because conservation programs seem to be intimately tied to the general renewal program.

THE WORKABLE PROGRAM

The "workable program" was devised to assure that certain aspects of the urban renewal program aided by federal funds would be safe-guarded. In other words, that slum clearance would not, in effect, cause more slums. The workable program when certified by the federal government for an area is a necessary prerequisite for the granting of federal funds.

The President of the United States included in his message to Congress recommendations now embodied in the Housing Act of 1954 which said in part:

"In order to clear our slums and blighted areas and to improve our communities, we must eliminate the causes of slums and blight. This is essentially a problem for our cities. However, federal assistance is justified for communities which face up to the problem of neighborhood decay and undertake long-range programs directed to its prevention."

The workable program which was implied in the above quotation from the President is explained in a report entitled, How Localities Can Develop a Workable Program for Urban Renewal. This government document is an excellent frame of reference with which to understand the impact of renewal.²

² Published by the Housing and Home Finance Agency (Dec. 1955)

CODES AND ENFORCEMENT

One of the keys to the success of any renewal program is the enforcement of codes and standards set up by local public agencies. Pressures by certain private interest groups (owners of slums or near-slums) to break down the enforcement pattern must always be dealt with. Following is some evidence of the breakdown of code enforcement.

The Comptroller General of the United States has issued a report on the efficiency of local public agencies in the control of slum generation in Chicago. A few quotes on these findings are illuminating:³

"URA (Urban Renewal Administration) officials also expressed concern regarding the inadequacy of the city's code enforcement and conservation programs which failed to fully (a) protect racial transition areas from overcrowding through code enforcement, (b) encourage conservation programs for more of the racial transition areas, and (c) prevent further overcrowding of areas adjacent to slum clearance areas. URA officials recommended, as a prerequisite to the execution of capital grant contracts for these projects, that the LPA (Local Public Agency) submit full information on the city's plans and programs for correcting the previously mentioned adverse conditions."

One more piece of evidence indicated that code violation reporting was not being followed up. The Comptroller General of the United States reports further:⁴

"Our review of the relocation records of the Michael Reese Hospital Project showed that some families had voluntarily moved from the project area into accommodations, near or immediately adjacent to the project area. These accommodations did not meet the LPA standards for decent, safe, and sanitary permanent housing. No evidence was found in the LPA's relocation records to indicate that the substandard condition of the dwellings had been reported to the city's code enforcement units.

³ These quotes are from Report on Audit of Chicago Regional Office, Office of the Administrator, Housing and Home Finance Agency, For the Fiscal Year ended June 30, 1955, Comptroller General of the United States.

⁴ Ibid.

Further inquiry on the subject produced a statement that verbal reports were made to local code enforcement officials, but that nothing else was done. An exchange of letters between the office of the Comptroller General, the Acting Commissioner of the Urban Renewal Administration and the Regional Administrator of LPA programs failed to reveal any real plans for notifying in writing code enforcement officials when relocatees were housed in sub-standard dwellings.

The above data at least indicates that code enforcement is not one of the more important tools being used to create standard housing for the people of Chicago. The important questions that we must ask and get meaningful answers to are:

1. How many dwellings in the city of Chicago are standard (including occupancy) in terms of city codes?
2. How many dwellings are substandard?
3. What is the rate by which dwellings are becoming substandard?
4. What penalties have been imposed in the enforcement of the city codes?
5. How many dwellings have been brought up to standard through code enforcement?
6. What has been the trend toward substandardness in the Negro residential concentration relative to the white areas? What picture do we get in terms of residential areas in transition from white to Negro?
7. Where answers are available to these questions are they in a form so that interested agencies may use them for references in their day to day work?

While these pieces are just fragments of the total picture, they are sample enough to encourage a full-scale investigation of the problem.

HOUSING FOR DISPLACED PERSONS

NUMBER OF PERSONS DISPLACED BY PROGRAM

One of the most dramatic aspects of the renewal program deals with the displacement of persons living on clearance sites designated for public improvement of one kind or another. The mere description of the number of persons involved indicates the magnitude of the problem.

Based on a report by the Office of the Redevelopment and Housing Coordinator, it is estimated that 23,894 families and 7,101 individuals had been displaced from 1948 through 1956 in the total physical renewal program. This includes the programs from 1948 of the Board of Education, Chicago Dwellings Association, Chicago Housing Authority, Land Clearance Commission, Chicago Park District, De LaSalle Institute, Department of Buildings, Highway Departments, Illinois Institute of Technology, Medical Center Commission, Michael Reese Hospital and the Veterans Administration. This conglomerate of organizations, with varying standards for the relocation of persons displaced by their individual programs, have displaced an estimated 86,000 persons. A number of persons equal to or greater than the 1950 population of the capital of Illinois -- Springfield.

Of this number, approximately 58,000 or about 2/3 are estimated to be nonwhite. Exact figures on the proportions that are nonwhite are not available from the organizations doing the displacement and relocation.

One big question is whether these figures are correct estimates in terms of total numbers and the proportion that is nonwhite. Certain sources state that an area that has been designated for clearance is emptied almost immediately by some residents. Generally, the person moves so quickly that he is not counted as a relocatee but he is nevertheless a part of the displacement problem. Some interpret this early evacuation as an indication that there is not too much of a housing problem. Others interpret this as being a case of recognition by some of the displaced persons that there is a housing problem and they leave early in order to get the best of the available supply. In any event, there are grounds for thinking that the above estimates of the reported population displaced are less than the actual population displaced.

Another big question is the allocation of resources for the proper relocation of displaced persons. Symbolic of this is the almost total lack of adequate reports on the characteristics of the relocatees. One exception to this is the report by the Chicago Housing Authority entitled Relocation of Site Residents to Private Housing, November 1955. Relatively comprehensive reports like the one cited do generate more public confidence in relocation activities of agencies.

The current relocation load of all agencies will create a demand for rehousing greater than that of the period from 1948-56. It is anticipated* that between January 1, 1958 and December 31, 1959--a two year period, a total of 36,000 families will be compelled to seek housing from sites that are approved or will be approved during the period. If the normal family size of 3.3 persons obtains, we can project the total to 119,000 persons. No estimates are available for unrelated single persons, however, past relocation experience indicates that these individuals represent approximately 10 per cent of the total relocation population load. Thus, 12,000 single person households will be similarly affected. This staggering total of 131,000 Chicagoans will be displaced and require housing. This is equal to the 1950 population of Gary, Indiana. Of this 131,000 relocatees, it is estimated by the Office of Housing and Redevelopment Coordinator that 55-65 per cent are nonwhite. This means that between 72,000 and 85,000 Negroes will require rehousing.

The above facts support the need for an insistence on the most elaborate type of organization of both people and facts in order to satisfactorily effect the relocation of these displaced persons. They further support the need for an insistence on the presentation of the total facts to the people and their agencies so that a constant appraisal may be made of the renewal program in terms of population displacement.

* By Housing and Redevelopment Coordinators Office, 1957

SYMPTOMS OF POOR RELOCATION POLICY AND PRACTICE

The Chicago Plan Commission in a recent report plays up some of the significant aspects of the relocation problem. A summary of some of the ideas generated in this report are as follows:⁵

A significant number of persons, who have been removed from areas because of the urban renewal clearance program, have not been relocated in satisfactory housing.

Considerable economic stress has been laid upon a significant number of families displaced by the relocation process. This economic hardship has the potential for creating serious problems, e.g., the doubling up of families to pay high rents.

The great majority of displaced families were nonwhite, for whom the quest for adequate housing is nearly always a problem.

There is substantial evidence that the relocation process is contributing to the further concentration, enlargement and institutionalization of the present Negro residential concentration.⁶

One of the necessary elements of the Workable Program is that there be adequate rehousing of families displaced by urban renewal. This is a prerequisite to the disbursement of some federal funds for urban renewal.

Further problems were revealed in the Comptroller General's report previously cited. In a section of the report entitled "Adequacy of LPA's (local public agency's) Relocation Activities Not Determined by URA (Urban Renewal Administration)" the following facts were revealed:

1. The Comptroller General's office was concerned with getting some sort of sample of the situation.
2. Examination of eight families which were designated as self-relocated and in private-rental standard housing uncovered errors in record. Five of the families were actually in substandard dwellings.

⁵ Based on Report No. 2, Chicago Plan Commission, A Report On Relocation, Chicago, 1957, p. 22.

⁶ Substantiation of this will be found in the Comptroller General's Report cited above and in the Chicago Housing Authority Report cited in this section.

3. The local public agency declared that it was in error but declined to say a review of its program might be in order.

THE NEED FOR A COMPREHENSIVE MASTER PLAN FOR THE GROWTH OF THE CITY

Life in present-day America is very much predicated on the concept of planning. Million dollar corporations market new products only after extensive research and planning. The federal government, in all its operations is involved in the planning process. Municipalities, large and small, conceive and execute rebuilding schemes after intensive planning. Thus, planning as a means to the "better life", is an acceptable and essential tool.

What have the planners -- or more correctly, those who control planning policy and direction, designed for the citizenry of Chicago? Chicago has not yet achieved a comprehensive city plan showing in outline form the future development, indicating how areas should be treated (clearance, rehabilitation, conservation), and showing the ways in which neighborhoods should be redeveloped and renewed. In the meantime, decisions regarding urban redevelopment, public and private housing, commerce, industry, transportation and community facilities are often being made without regard to the standards required for sound future growth and in a pattern which may not readily fit into the comprehensive plan, if and when it is completed. Densities in public housing projects, for instance, are so high and public open spaces so lacking that these projects will almost certainly be regarded as substandard 20 years hence and in fact are so regarded today by many. Also, the selection of sites on which public housing is built seems to be motivated by a desire to contain Negroes, who occupy the bulk of public housing, within the walls of the existing Negro ghetto. This is not sound planning.

Analysis of urban renewal project data shows that instead of a comprehensive master plan we are presented with spotty programs aimed at the alleviation of conditions within a given community and without adequate relation to their effect on neighboring areas, or the city as a whole. Often the decision as to which neighborhood gets a program is dependent upon the concern of its local citizenry and the expression of that concern into a demand for action. Today, in Chicago there are many community areas with high concentrations of substandard housing which remain untouched by urban renewal or other programs.

In order to document this lack of planning the following excerpts of a speech by Dennis O'Harrow, Executive Director of the American Society of Planning Officials are offered. This expert on planning spoke before the annual meeting of the South Side Planning Board on May 2, 1957. He said:

"The willingness and desires of the citizens of Chicago to use planning to produce a better city are about as clear as they could possibly be. In fact, I cannot think of any city in the United States in which there is one-half as much citizen activity along the line.

I said before that effective planning requires agreement by both citizens and the city government that they want it to be effective. It seems to me that the citizens have demonstrated their interest, over and over again. What about the city government?

I must confess that it has not been equally clearly demonstrated that the Chicago city government has either the desire for or faith in planning that the Chicago citizens have...there is no stated plan by the city government looking toward a greater Chicago.....

There must be a positive, aggressive, forward-looking interest, if Chicago is to grow by plan and not by chance...."

O'Harrow's concept is amply supported in a Public Administration Service report entitled Reorganizing Chicago's Redevelopment and Housing.⁷ It asserts "that organizational and administrative improvements hold promise of making accomplishment easier where the people of the city want the programs and where responsible public officials support them with informed and active leadership."

In summary, there are millions of dollars that are being spent and are going to be spent for schools, roads, housing projects and industrial developments for the declared purpose of renewing our central city -- Chicago. However, there does not seem to exist what is needed most; namely: an officially stated, comprehensive, long range general plan for the physical development of Chicago.

Consonant with the need for sound, long range, comprehensive physical planning is the requirement for the same type of social planning. While much of the details of physical planning encompass elements of the social planning process, there is often a disregard for the effects of planning on the social fabric of the urban setting.

In concluding comment on this section, it may be important to note why sound physical and social planning is important to the Chicago Urban League. In the first place, it would allow the League along with other interested agencies to make reasonable forecasts of the human consequences of the actions indicated by the plan. Secondly, it would enable the League to make constructive contributions to the solutions of the social problems generated. The League has a vested interest in the good organization of the urban renewal program. A better pattern of planning than we have presently would make it possible for the Chicago Urban League to use its resources and activities to a greater advantage than that of merely exposing symptoms of disorganization and faulty planning.

⁷ A summary of a report to the Committee on Housing of the City Council of Chicago, Public Administration Service, Chicago, 1952.

A P P E N D I X
